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In a mixed oligopoly, when the public leader becomes a private leader and the government
provides output subsidies, then privatization causes the optimal subsidy, profits and welfare
to fall [Economics Letters 83 (2004) 411]. We show instead that if the leader and the
followers receive asymmetric, rather than symmetric subsidies, the first-best optimum can be
restored. In this case, privatization bears no consequences on the followers' subsidy, output
and welfare.
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Public ￿rms operate in oligopolistic markets and compete with private ￿rms in the pro-
vision of products and services. A market, where a public ￿rm, instructed to maximize
its contribution to social surplus, interacts with a multitude of pro￿t maximizing ￿rms,
is termed as a mixed oligopoly (see e.g., Cremer, Marchand and Thisse [1991], De Fraja
and Delbono [1989, 1990], George and La Manna [1996] for an excellent survey). The
regulation of mixed oligopolies has received signi￿cant attention in the industrial organi-
zation literature. This has been coupled (in some cases) with an interest to investigate
the consequences of privatization on the optimal policies. The importance of the latter
cannot be exaggerated, given the widespread adoption of privatization programmes in
several countries such as Italy, France, Israel, Portugal (see Anderson et al., 1997, for a
more detailed discussion).
An important conclusion from this strand of literature is that output, pro￿ts and
welfare at the ￿rst-best optimum are identical, irrespective of whether the public ￿rm:
(i) moves simultaneously with the private ￿rms, (ii) is a Stackelberg leader, or (iii) is
privatized and acts simultaneously with the private ￿rms to maximize pro￿ts; so-called
￿irrelevance result￿(see White, 1996; Poyago￿ Theotoky, 2001; Myles, 2002).
More recently, Fjell and Heywood (2004) showed that this result can be overturned,
when assuming that the public leader becomes a private leader after the privatization.
In this case, the optimal output subsidy, pro￿ts and welfare are all reduced in the post-
privatization case. However, this ￿relevance result￿is generated on the assumption of
￿equal subsidies for di⁄erent ￿rms￿ ,1 which preserves an ine¢ cient allocation of produc-
tion costs across ￿rms (i.e., a second-best optimum is attained). Indeed, by considering
the more plausible case of asymmetric subsidies, we show that the irrelevance result can
be recovered (at least partially). In this respect, the optimal subsidies bring about the
￿rst-best allocation, since they can tackle the existing market failures. More speci￿cally,
we ￿nd that the leader receives a smaller subsidy and the followers a larger subsidy than
under an equal subsidies policy; and that the output of the leader becomes smaller but
the output of the followers larger. It turns out, however, that the latter e⁄ect is stronger
and indeed may well dominate, thus causing the level of total output to rise. Finally,
we obtain that the increase in total production and the associated e¢ ciency enhancing
e⁄ect of the optimal subsidies (such that output is equalized across ￿rms) will lead to an
increase in the social surplus to the ￿rst-best level.
2 The model
Our envisaged industry consists of one public ￿rm and n private ￿rms serving a single
market of homogeneous good. The inverse demand function is linear p = a ￿ Q, where
Q = q0 +
Pn
i=1 qi is total output made up from a ￿ public￿and a ￿ private￿component,
respectively. All ￿rms are assumed to operate under identical cost functions. These are
of the standard form Cj(qj) = c + (1=2)kq2
j, j 2 f0;:::;ng, k > 0, implying an increasing
marginal cost.2 We set c = 0 so as to abstein from entry issues, while avoiding any loss
of generality.
1The leader who enjoys a ￿rst-mover advantage, receives a subsidy equal to the followers￿ .
2This assumption is standard in the mixed oligopoly literature and serves the purpose of ruling out
the uninteresting case of a public monopoly.
1We will compare the post-privatization symmetric subsidies regime with the asym-
metric subsidies one. Each private ￿rm￿ s pro￿t function is given by





i + sqi, i 2 f1;:::;ng; (1)
where s is the output subsidy. Similarly, the pro￿t function for the public ￿rm is
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The standard indirect e⁄ect of the subsidy s amounts to saying that the public ￿rm￿ s
decision variable will be a⁄ected indirectly by the private ￿rms￿responsiveness to their
own subsidy.
Our three stage game with observable actions is in order. In stage one, the government
commits to an output subsidy. That is, market participants receive (i) identical subsidies
or (ii) all subsidies are equal except for the public ￿rm￿ s. In stage 2, the public ￿rm
chooses its output to maximize pro￿ts. The private ￿rms￿output selection follows in the
last stage, 3.
2.1 The privatized Stackelberg oligopoly with identical subsi-
dies
Solving for the SPNE of this game by backward induction, the reaction function of the
i-th ￿rm in the last stage is
qi(q0) =
a + s ￿ q0
1 + k + n
: (4)
The privatized leader, taking into account (4), sets its output to maximize own pro￿ts
for a given subsidy. The solution to this yields
q0(s) =
(1 + k)(a + s)
(1 + k)(2 + k) + nk
: (5)





where ￿ = (1+ 2n)+k(4+7n+2n2)+k2(6+9n+4n2+n3)+k3(4+5n+2n2)+k4(1+n)
and B = (1+2n)2 +k(5+17n+15n2 +4n3)+k2(10+28n+21n2 +6n3 +n4)+k3(10+
22n + 13n2 + 3n3) + k4(5 + 8n + 3n2) + k5(1 + n):
2Using the solution for the optimal subsidy, we obtain the following SPNE outcomes
q0 =
a(1 + k)(n + k + 1)E
B
qi =









where E = (1+k)2 +n(1+k)(2+k)+kn2 and C = (n2 +3n+1)+k(4+10n+4n2)+
k2(6 + 12n + 5n2 + n3) + k3(4 + 6n + 2n2) + k4(1 + n).
The government has two targets to control for: underproduction and ine¢ ciency in
the allocation of equilibrium cost across ￿rms. Given that the public ￿rm is in the leader
position, the optimal output subsidy can address the former distortion alone. Indeed, the
fact that all ￿rms are subsidized at the same rate reinforces the ￿rst-mover advantage
of the leading ￿rm and, in turn, enlarges the gap between price and the public ￿rm￿ s
marginal cost.3 This line of justi￿cation was provided by Fjell and Heywood (2004) to
explain as to why the irrelevance result of White (1996) and Poyago￿ Theotoky (2001)
does no longer apply to this context.4 Hence, it is obvious that public policy can lead to
a second-best optimum with two targets to control for and only one policy instrument
available.
2.2 The privatized Stackelberg oligopoly with asymmetric sub-
sidies
How are the previous results a⁄ected when the government can provide asymmetric rather
than symmetric subsidies? Providing an answer to this question forms the subject of the
present section.
The public ￿rm, realizing the reaction function of each follower as in (4), chooses its
output to maximize pro￿ts for given subsidies. The solution to this problem gives rise to
the following output
q0(s0;s) =
a(1 + k) ￿ ns + (1 + k + n)s0
2 + k2 + k(3 + n)
: (8)
Substituting (8) into (4), we obtain the output of each private ￿rm
qi(s0;s) =
a[1 + k2 + k(2 + n)] + (1 + k)(2 + k + n)s ￿ (1 + k + n)s0
(1 + k + n)[2 + k2 + k(3 + n)]
: (9)
In stage one, the government maximizes welfare with respect to s0 and s, leading to the
following subsidies
3The assumption of increasing marginal and total cost is crucial for this result.
4When the public ￿rm is privatized and acts simultaneously with the private ￿rms to maximize pro￿ts,





(1 + k + n)2, s
￿ =
a
1 + k + n
: (10)

















a2 [2 + k2 + k(3 + n)]









2(1 + k + n)
: (11)
The use of asymmetric subsidies restores the ￿rst-best optimum, since price equals
marginal cost (p￿ = kq￿). Moreover, the irrelevance result is generated with the exception
of the public ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts. In this case, each follower makes a larger pro￿t compared to
the leader￿ s pro￿t (see Appendix A).
2.3 Comparison and discussion of the results
Comparing the case of symmetric subsidies with the case of asymmetric ones, we obtain
that in the former the public leader receives a larger subsidy, but the followers receive a
smaller subsidy. In addition to that, the leader produces more output and the market
price is higher. It also comes at no surprise that welfare is strictly higher under the









(1 + k + n)2B
q
￿
0 ￿ q0 = ￿
an2 [F + k(3 + 3n + n2)]
(1 + k + n)B
q
￿
i ￿ qi =
an[F + k(3 + 4n + n2)]
(1 + k + n)B
p
￿ ￿ p = ￿
akn3
(1 + k + n)B
W
￿ ￿ W =
a2kn3
2(1 + k + n)B
(12)
G = (1 + 2n) + 2k(2 + 3n + n2) + k2(6 + 6n + n2) + 2k3(2 + n) + k4;
K = (1+2n)+k(5+7n+2n2)+k2(10+12n+5n2+n3)+k3(10+10n+3n2)+k4(5+3n)+k5
F = (1 + 2n) + k2(3 + 2n) + k3:
4The logic behind these results can be seen by recalling the objectives of public pol-
icy. When it comes to the optimal intervention, it is clear that the government faces
two distortions (as mentioned previously). This implies that two policy instruments are
required in order to attain the ￿rst-best allocation. The implementation of asymmetric
subsidies serves this purpose. Indeed, the public leader is subsidized at a lower rate than
the followers and therefore, the share of the private ￿rms in total production increases
(see Appendix A). Conversely, the optimal subsidies imply a cost redistribution e⁄ect,
in addition to raising the total output level. With a two-fold role of subsidization, this
positively in￿ uences welfare and restores the ￿rst-best optimum.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that in contrast to previous treatments of the same topic,
the order of the ￿rms￿moves after privatization may not be a crucial determinant of the
results. What matters though is whether it is possible to provide ￿rm-speci￿c subsidies for
the public and the private ￿rms. In particular, when the public leader becomes a private
leader subsequent to privatization, this mandates lower subsidies for the leader than for
its private counterparts, which implies that the ￿rst-best allocation can be restored.
Our results do not overturn the ￿ndings of Fjell and Heywood (2004), but rather
do complement them. In this respect, the use of asymmetric subsidies increases the
e⁄ectiveness of intervention in that all market failures can be addressed. Indeed, our
study suggests that privatization can still be socially desirable, even if the public leader
retains its position post-privatization, provided that the private followers can receive
larger subsidies than the leader.
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